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Abstract 
Stateless nations across the EU have become increasingly vocal and confident in asserting a 
desire for autonomy, devolved governance, and independence. Meanwhile, identity politics 
has become a key factor of contemporary European regional development, with utility as a 
social, economic and governance tool.  Culture has become a resource for regional branding 
to attract inward investment and differentiate in terms of competitiveness.  The paper 
considers whether the utility of identity to regional development might provide an 
explanation for the growing confidence of EU stateless nations. We use the case study of 
Cornwall to explore the correlation, arguing that economic regionalism has provided a space 




Across the European Union, regions are asserting desire to ether secede from the nation states 
of which they are a part, or making strong calls for more decision making autonomy.  
Sometimes, as in the case of Scotland, this is based on a long history as a ‘nation’ in their 
own right, before becoming subsumed into the nation state of which they now form a part.   
Alternatively as in the case of Sardinia, calls for autonomy are grounded in claims about a 
shared present.  We might characterise this as a movement of what Guibernau (1999) calls 
‘nations without States’. Leaving Scotland and its independence referendum aside, this 
includes Catalunya (Miley 2013) and the Basque Country (Gomez-Forbes and Cabeza Perez 
2013) questioning their relationship with Spain; Brittany with France (Gemie 2005), and 
Friesland with Belgium (Boonen and Hooghe 2014).   Within the first few months of 2014, 
4000 people demonstrated in Brussels to call for self-determination (European Free Alliance 
EFA 2014), and only a few days earlier Hungarian political parties in Transylvania drew up 
proposals for autonomy for Szeklerland (Nationalia 2014).  Pro-independence parties in 
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Sardinia doubled their Parliamentary vote share to 18% in elections held in February 
(Nationalia 2014b), and in an unofficial referendum in March, 2.1 million residents of 
Venice, (out of an electorate of 3.7 million) voted to restore an independent Venetian republic 
(Daily Telegraph 2014).  This raises questions regarding the relationship between European 
states and their constituent regions, including possible explanations for what appears to be a 
pan-European national fragmentation.  
     Whilst scholars have examined individual instances of internal nationalisms and 
regionalist movements, explored the primacy of a European identity over a national one 
(Glencross 2011; Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2011), and considered the hopes that stateless 
nations have had of EU support (Hepburn and Elias 2011), the ongoing strength of claims by 
nations without states is under theorised as a phenomenon in itself.  Traditional explanations 
might draw on Gellner (2006) to claim that that this phenomenon is linked to the inability of 
the contemporary European state to adequately represent its regions, which lose attachment to 
State identity, falling back on invented or actual traditions (see Hobsbawm 1992) to reassert a 
sense of nationhood.  This is certainly the kind of framework within which devolution 
movements within the UK in the late 20
th
 century were presented, with scholars such as Nairn 
(1981), Hobsbawm (1992) and Hechter (1975) claiming that nationalisms in peripheries were 
forms of emancipatory movements.  Hechter even goes as far as to call such nations ‘internal 
colonies’, subject to exploitation by the centre.  Leaving aside Connor’s (1994) point that 
some such nationalisms (ie, Catalunya) are in regions that are richer than the states within 
which they are situated, the contemporary European Union context has technically given the 
regions much greater attention than might have happened previously (Hepburn and Elias 
2011).   Indeed, regional governance is embedded within EU structures as a ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ to counter what otherwise may be perceived to be distant and centralised European 
centres of power (Keating 2000); providing a more democratised and federal relationship 
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between regions and Brussels (Keating 2008; Tomaney and Pike, 2006). This may go some 
way towards mitigating the alienation often characterised as integral to national 
fragmentation.  However, regions and regionalism requires some further definition. 
       The ‘region’ is a complex and contested entity, which Jones and Macleod (2004) 
describe as being derived from both top-down and bottom-up movements.  ‘Regional Spaces’ 
refers to the top-down forces of regionalism, whereby economic and political governance 
structures create rationally bounded territorial units.  The old Regional tier of governance in 
the UK is an example of this.  ‘Spaces of Regionalism’ (Jones and Macleod, 2004) refer to 
popular grassroots regional movements, based around territorial units independent of 
governance structures.  Willett and Giovannini (2014) discuss the difficulties that governance 
can have in mobilising local inhabitants behind ‘regional spaces’, as opposed to the popular 
movements of ‘spaces of regionalism’.  In practical terms, this means that regions are not 
neat, objective categories, but are multi-faceted constructions developed from a range of 
cultural, political, and economic processes.  Official or imagined regions might adhere to the 
borders of national identities (such as Scotland, or Wales), or alternatively as in the case of 
Cornwall, nations might be subsumed in within a larger regional body (Willett and 
Giovannini, 2014). 
           There are further factors behind the growing strength of calls for independence or 
greater autonomy, and a link this comes from the connections that Bond, McCrone and 
Brown (2003) make with regards to the importance of Scottish national identity to economic 
development.  Indeed, John Agnew in his 2001 article Regions in Revolt, asserts the 
importance of political economy in regional differentiation, arguing that this became 
overlooked as devolutionist and separatist movements are usually characterised in terms of 
ethnicity.  This is an interesting claim given that more usually it is argued that the 
contemporary globalised neoliberal economy flattens out the differences within states (and 
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Gellner’s work which ties together nation, state, industrialisation and modernity is part of 
this), and ‘homogenises’ differences between nations (see also Ariely, 2012).  The globalised 
consumption of identities means that national differences become fuzzy, rather than sharp.  
At the same time, identities become increasingly individuated, detached from territorial 
affinities, and based around patterns of consumption (Bauman 2011; Giddens 1991).  In 
Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity, culture no longer satisfies needs, but is charged with 
the generation of new needs, to seduce the consumer.  However the threats to the nation state 
as a concept seems to be coming not from global capital, as imagined at the turn of the 21
st
 
century (see Stuart 2001), but from secessionist and devolutionist movements from within the 
state.      
      Indeed, one of the complex processes through which regions have come to play a more 
significant role is within the global marketplace, through the homogenisation/globalisation 
nexus discussed above.  Here, the mobility of goods and capital within neoliberal economies 
requires the removal of trade barriers held by nation states (Dicken, 2007).  In a challenge to 
traditional Westphalian models of statehood, this encourages supra-national entities such as 
the Single Market of the European Union, although it also applies to the global marketplace.  
In this context, regions have become increasingly autonomous and powerful as economic 
units, as national borders have decreased in their importance (Keating, 2008; Keating, 2000).  
This means that there is an interesting double-movement at work.  Whilst the contemporary 
global economy might be decreasing the influence and identity of the nation state, it might 
also be providing the space for increasing regional individuation. 
     This brings us back again to Agnew’s point regarding political economy, which warrants 
further examination regarding what is occurring in Europe.  As alluded to by Bond, McCrone 
and Brown (2003), regional governance is not just about democratising political engagement, 
but also plays a role in the governance of economic development.  A key site of this is 
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‘competitive regions’ (Herrschel 2010) through which regions seek to differentiate 
themselves in the global marketplace (See also Keating 2008).  Keating (2000) calls this the 
‘new regionalism’, mirroring a global economic shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist 
economic arrangement, signalling the demise of large scale production to an increasingly 
specialised but smaller scale model with much more flexibility.  Echoing Agnew, 
Regionalism here is primarily a story of economic development, far removed from ideas of 
ethnic emancipation (see also Willett 2013).  This certainly might provide an explanation for 
the growing assertiveness of regions, and their increasing centrality in European structures.  
Moreover it raises the possibility of an interplay between the current strength of regionalist 
movements in Europe, and contemporary regional economic development.  In the next part of 
this paper we explore how regional identity is interwoven into development strategies and 
theory, before moving to a case study of Cornwall as an empirical example to consider a 
possible link between regionalism, economic development and growing regional 
assertiveness. 
     In a reversal of the standardisation project of the liberal state (see Gellner 2006), regional 
identity has widely become seen as a good in and of itself as a functional tool for improving 
the economy.  For example, Pike, Rodriguez-Pose and Tomaney (2006) provide us with 
seven approaches to regional development, from which identity emerges as a cross-cutting 
theme.  In truth, these approaches blend into and borrow from each other, so it can be tricky 
to separate the difference between the ‘innovative milieux’ of innovation, knowledge and 
learning, from the ‘clustering’ of extended neo-classical models, or the ‘social capital’ of 
institutionalism and social economy from ‘quality of life’ in sustainable development. For 
neo-classicists, it provides a marketable asset which can be used to sell regional products, 
cluster ‘knowledge’ around traditions of expertise (Hilpert, 2006), configure regional 
innovation systems (Asheim 2012), and attract inward investment for business.  This 
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enhances regional competitiveness in the national, supranational, and international economic 
environments (Kitson et al. 2004; Cooke 2002).   
     This raises the question about whether identity is a good in and of itself, or whether it is 
good for its utility.   At the beginning of this debate, identity, culture, and heritage are a good 
in and of themselves.  However, the long term survival of identities, traditions, and cultural 
practices was under threat because they had become considered as hopelessly old fashioned, 
over-romanticised with no part in the technological landscape of the 21
st
 century (Bruckmeier 
and Tovey 2008).  The solution to this problem was to emphasise the economic utility of 
cultural distinctiveness which could be preserved through its commodification for a 
tourist/heritage market, and through the sale of ‘regional’ goods (Bessiere 1998).  Regional 
cultural distinctiveness could be sustained through an emphasis on its economic utility. 
Consequently, identity in this discourse shifted from being a good in and of itself, to 
something whose preservation and conservation was contingent on its economic function.   
     The function of identity to regional economies has become particularly well developed in 
the literature and policy which derives from Richard Florida’s (2002) ‘creative industries’. 
Florida claimed that dynamic and innovative individuals are attracted to places within which 
they can exercise their creativity socially and experience a great quality of life.  This creates 
the kind of lifestyle where an individual can maximise their liberal freedoms, and which is 
later translated into economic creativity and innovation. Florida claimed that this process 
fostered the conceptual freedom and innovative milieu which allowed Silicon Valley to 
flourish.  In practical regional policy terms, this is interpreted as encouraging creative and 
cultural industries in order to attract dynamic entrepreneurs who can contribute to local 
economies  (Herslund 2012; Halfacree 2012).  This requires regional brand identities to draw 
on specific cultural and historic strengths in order to market the area (Giles et al. 2013; Lee et 
7 
 
al. 2005), plugging in to cultural heritage, innovative milieu and clustering (Aula and 
Haarmakorpi 2008), and neo-endogenous growth. 
      So far, identity is imagined as a passive object, created and fostered either for 
consumption or to initiate a billiard ball type mechanical chain of events.  Robert Putnam’s 
(2000) Social Capital changes this, offering a concept through which identity becomes 
operationalised and active.  Strong local identities both foster and draw on well-developed 
networks of interactions between individuals, businesses and other organisations (Lee et al. 
2005).  From a broader economic perspective, the networks developed and interactions that 
this enables facilitate information sharing and the development of mutually supportive 
relationships crucial for a well-functioning business environment (Waters and Lawton Smith 
2008; Atterton 2007).  This enables the mobilisation of indigenous potential (Pike et al. 2006) 
and enhances human capital, allowing individuals to maximise their personal and economic 
potential (Shortall 2004).  Participation in traditional cultural and historic events are one way 
of developing social capital (Baker and Brown 2008), emphasising the economic function 
and utility of identity, and illustrating Bond, McCrone and Brown’s (2003) argument about 
the importance of Scottish identity to economic development. 
      Clearly, identity has utility as a social, economic, and even governance tool, encouraging 
regions to celebrate their identities and the things that make them different and distinctive 
from other spaces, in order to compete better in the European and global economy (Herrschel, 
2010; Keating, 2008; Willett, 2013).  In practice there can be a risk of identikit regional 
policies, but it offers the space for regions to assert their identities, and technically consider 
more locally based forms of governance. This calls for a practical examination of the 
interplay between newly assertive regions and the identity politics of contemporary economic 
development.  For this we turn to the case study of Cornwall to look at some of the potential 
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effects of using identity as a development tool, asking if there may be a link between identity-
based regional development and the growth in nationalist movements. 
Method 
For the case study we wanted to trace the significance of identity in popular discourse over a 
period of time, and for this we needed a region that was a nationalist latecomer.  It would be 
difficult to separate out the more regular exemplars of Scotland and Wales in the UK; or 
Catalunya or the Basque region with Spain; from the changing role of the regions articulated 
in the new regionalism.  For example, Bond et al (2003) make it clear that Scotland, 
nationalism, and economy are deeply intertwined.  However the broader visibility Scottish 
nationalism easily predates the new regionalism (see also Hobsbawm 1992; Nairn 1981).  
Cornwall, in the far South West of the UK has been less successful at making its calls for 
devolution heard beyond its borders, was previously considered too small to be a governance 
region in its own right (Willett and Giovannini, 2014; Jones and Macleod, 2004) and so has 
arrived later in the popular imagination.  This makes it a clearer case study to explore the 
changing nature of regionalism.   
     The primary research on which the following draws comes from a documentary analysis.  
The reason for this is that we wanted to understand the development of Cornish identity in 
popular discourse over a period of time.  In this instance, interview data, with its 
interpretation of the past from the perspective of the present, would make an interesting next 
step, but its subjectivity is inappropriate here.  To explore the changing nature of the role of 
identity within economic development in Cornwall we begin with a précis of key economic 
development documents from the 1970’s to the present day.  However whilst this highlights 
the growth in rhetoric around Cornish identity, it does not demonstrate the degree to which 
Cornish identity has become embedded into popular consciousness. For this, the second part 
of our empirical analysis turns to the use of identity-based symbolisms within political 
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discourse in recent Cornish history.  Again, here we use a combination of publications and 
policy/campaign reporting in order to understand how discourse was argued, presented and 
constructed at the time. 
 
Cornish identity, nationalism and regional economic development 
This section is made of two parts.  Firstly, we consider the treatment of identity with regards 
to Cornish development over various late 20
th
 century moments to the present day.  The 
second part grows out of the need to explore Cornish identity within civil society, and for this 
we look at the influence of Cornish nationalism in local politics. 
      It is relatively straightforward to map the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist economy 
(see Rodriguez et al 2006, Keating, 2008) onto the rhetoric at the heart of Cornish economic 
development.  In the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s much of the emphasis was on attracting large 
manufacturing enterprises to counteract unemployment and depopulation caused by declining 
traditional industries (Spooner 1972; CIDA 1976; CCC 1977).  This was not just about 
importing jobs to soak up growing unemployment, but was founded on the belief that a 
critical mass of population is required in order to sustain a functioning economy. Rural 
Cornwall with its small towns, sparsely populated hinterlands and numerous small businesses 
with little value added needed to be shaped to fit prevailing sectoral economic orthodoxy (see 
also Keating 2000).  Needless to say, identity and cultural issues were far removed from the 
rational economy, and perhaps could even be considered antithetical to the rational efficiency 
of market principles (Cooke 2002).   Such an approach was still in evidence in 1987 at a 
conference organised by the Duchy of Cornwall, entitled ‘Cornwall, The Way Ahead’.  
Discussions were very much along the lines of earlier economic development, with an 
emphasis on the inward migration of manufacturing - sometimes embellished with 
international case studies to explore how to improve jobs, infrastructure and skills base.  
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Interestingly though, it is also here that we start to see some mention of the idea that 
‘Cornwall is a nice place to be’ which would permeate later development documents, and 
which chimes very well with early 21
st
 century development orthodoxy, particularly clustered 
around creative industries type approaches (see Florida 2002; Halfacree 2012).  In a marked 
change from what would happen a little over ten years later, identity is conspicuous by its 
absence and whilst the conference was indeed about territorial development, seemingly 
ephemeral constructions of place had no role in development discourse.   
      In the early 1990’s we start to see a conceptual shift in the 1992 report ‘The Economic 
Perspective of Cornwall: A Project to Assess the Challenges Facing the Region for Private 
Sector Initiatives’, commissioned by South West Enterprise, a nascent private sector interest 
group (Hawkins Wright 1992).  The aim of the report was to assess the challenges facing the 
economy of Cornwall and establish priority areas for successful development.  Here we start 
to see serious discussion about how Cornwall ‘often lacks an effective international 
competitive market perspective’ (p.2).  It was argued that too much attention was placed on 
ensuring that businesses met economic development targets, but that not enough was given to 
trying to make businesses internationally competitive, building on sectors where Cornwall 
already had market strengths.  This report is interesting, vocalising a shift from a 
‘development aid’ type of culture, where Cornwall had to grow from the outside in, become 
more like other urban areas and was reliant on assistance to do so, to one where development 
is seen as needing to grow from the inside out, much more akin to the social capital type of 
development, articulated by Lee et al. (2005).  This involved nurturing existing strengths and 
building local capacity in order to compete internationally as a territorially bounded space 
(see Herschel 2010; Keating 2008).   
      Nevertheless, although this is starting to signal something new in regional economic 
governance, it was not until the end of the decade that this change was really in evidence, 
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following the campaign for EU structural funding.  Cornwall does not neatly overlay EU 
regional governance structures, and is a NUTS 2 region, rather than NUTS 1 area like 
Scotland or Wales.  The 1990’s campaign to acquire NUTS2 has already been dealt with 
elsewhere (Willett 2013), but it is useful to consider it here briefly as it is illustrative of the 
interplay between regional governance, economic development, and identity politics in 
Cornwall.   The campaign drew on narratives of Cornish national identity to say that 
Cornwall should be separated from neighbouring Devon as a NUTS 2 region in its own right, 
enabling broad based institutional and popular support for this otherwise obscure bureaucratic 
alteration (Willett 2013).  Known at the time as ‘Objective 1 Funding’, structural funds were 
(and still are) given to the most economically under-performing parts of the EU (Ramajo et 
al. 2008) and Cornwall, now a NUTS 2 region, qualified comfortably (Deacon et al. 
2003).    The Single Programming Document (SPD) outlining what Cornwall would do with 
the monies placed heavy emphasis on the Cetlticity of Cornish identity, drawing inferences to 
the ethnic difference of the Celtic Cornish from the Saxon English (Government Office South 
West 1999).  This is not surprising in and of itself, given that Cornish cultural differences 
were a central plank to the Objective 1 campaign.  But what this signalled, and echoing the 
shift towards identity politics in the academic regional development literature (ie Lee et al 
2005; Keating 2008; Herslund 2012), was the institutionalisation of the importance of 
‘Cornish cultural differences’ within local policy.  This is also where changing attitudes 
towards regional identity and development become most visible. 
      Cornish cultural distinctiveness has snowballed since this time.  Economic development 
literature has retained an emphasis on asserting Cornish ‘distinctiveness’, although the 
meaning of this distinctiveness has shifted from time to time.  The 2003 Strategy and Action 
(Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Economic Forum - CEF 2003) kept a meaningful link between 
economic strategy and symbolisms related to Cornish national heritage such as references to 
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the Celt and support for the language.  By 2007 Cornish ‘distinctiveness’ started to become 
removed from its prior ethnic foundations, and chiming with development norms (Florida 
2002; Halfacree 2012), was articulated around the distinctiveness of the kind of lifestyle that 
individuals could consume in Cornwall, such as watersports and an attractive landscape (CEF 
2007).  In the instance where ethnic symbolism was mentioned, the reference read terribly 
and appeared to have been inserted at the last minute, stating at the end of a paragraph about 
sports that there is a growing awareness of Celtic traditions ‘which have led to a greater pride 
and use of it (sic) to support economic activity’ (CEF 2007: 71).  This has altered again in the 
most recent strategic incarnation, which in a fascinating shift, is now a conjoined ‘Economic 
and Cultural Strategy’ (Cornwall Council 2014).    The document asserts amongst other 
things that it is ‘increasing business competitiveness through regional distinctiveness’ and 
‘growing the social reach and economic impact of the Cornish Language Partnership’ (p.13).  
In line with current trends (Hilpert 2006; Herschel 2010), this indicates the embedded nature 
of Cornish cultural distinctiveness within economic development literature in Cornwall.   
      It would be wrong, however, to claim too causal a relationship with EU strategic regional 
development structures.  The shifting meanings underlying ‘distinctiveness’ certainly echo 
the regional development literature (Giles et al. 2013; Keating 2008), and illustrates that 
economic competitive differentiation could have been achieved through various ‘lifestyle’ 
type factors including landscape, pace and quality of life (Halfacree 2012).  These are 
certainly alternative narratives that have retained a strong presence throughout Cornish 
economic development discourse for several decades and as we have seen above, there was a 
movement towards interpreting ‘distinctiveness’ in this way.  But recent economic policy not 
only re-integrates Cornish ethnicity, but fuses economic and cultural policy as mutually 
constitutive and symbiotic.  This is interesting, and echoing Agnew (2001), seems to show 
that in Cornwall at least, to characterise ethnic regionalism as ethnic regionalism is to miss 
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the most interesting parts of the story.  Instead, it is also a story of shifting local, regional and 
global political economy. 
       Moreover, and perhaps demonstrating Bauman’s (2011) Liquid Modernity, this is an 
interplay which is visible in the ways that Cornish cultural symbolisms have become 
embedded within the local business environment.  Since 2005 an adaptation of the black and 
white Cornish flag underpins the imagery of the Cornish brand.  The Blaze Marque is a 
competitive logo which is allowed to be adopted by only the strongest Cornish businesses 
who can promote regional innovation (Cornwall Brand 2014).  Successful applicants allowed 
to adopt the logo become brand ambassadors on a UK and international stage, fusing the 
nationalism of the flag with the growing confidence of the business environment.  In a similar 
vein, Visit Cornwall the tourist information service, has banned descriptions of Cornwall as a 
county that is part of England in its promotional material, instead preferring use of ‘region’ or 
‘Duchy’ as a geographical descriptor (Daily Telegraph 2012).  According to Malcolm Bell, 
head of Visit Cornwall and quoted in the Telegraph article, the organisation wanted to 
‘maximise our potential by making the most of how special Cornwall is’.  Other local 
businesses have taken to using symbolisms such as flag and/or tartan and language in the 
marketing of their products in sectors as diverse as beer (Skinners Brewery 2014), or Organic 
produce (Carleys Organic 2014).  Unsurprisingly, this is mirrored with a growing awareness 
and pride in a sense of distinct Cornish cultural identity within broader civil society, 
increasing the use of symbolisms associated with ethnicity and nationalism within popular 
culture (Husk and Williams 2012).   
      Here we see an empirical echo of the regional individuation of new regionalism, 
embedded in policy and observed by academia.  Cornish ethnicity and national culture has 
been encouraged, flourished, and developed through a number of mutually supportive 
feedback loops.  However, whilst EU regional and economic policy might have provided the 
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space for an articulation of Cornish ethnic identity, it could only have taken hold in the way 
that it has if it were embedded within deeper structures of meaning within popular culture 
(see also Willett 2013).  The rational use of cultural heritage might have ensured extra 
funding, but it could not make Cornish ethnicity resonate with the broader population, to the 
extent that its symbolisms are adopted within business and popular culture with the frequency 
that they are.  In other words, regional competitiveness has not made Cornwall assert its 
national heritage, but it does seem to have contributed to the space within which it has been 
able to take hold in ways that were not possible in different times.  But what this does not yet 
make clear, is the extent to which an increasingly assertive cultural regional identity, 
translates into political mobilisations, and for this we turn to an exploration of political 
nationalism within contemporary Cornwall. 
 
Cornish nationalism, Mebyon Kernow and agenda setting 
To follow Smith (1991), the politicisation of identity is the space where culture becomes 
mobilised.  We might conceptualise this as being a cultural mediation between the present 
and the past, translated into the future through politics.  In Cornwall, political identity is 
encapsulated in its nationalist party, Mebyon Kernow.  However to date, Mebyon Kernow 
have not yet secured a deposit in a general election, and whilst they have outpolled Labour in 
local elections, within Cornwall Council they are currently the 6th largest group with 4 
councillors out of 123 (Cornwall Council 2015).  On the face of it, despite the growing 
importance of regional identity within and outside the UK (Keating, 2008), party political 
Cornish nationalism appears as a persistent minority rather than as a significant force.  On 
initial inspection therefore, it would appear that this contemporary regional identity is all 
about political economy (see Agnew 2001) in a globalised or supranational environment 
(Dicken, 2007), where the region is an increasingly important actor.  However we will assert 
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that to make claims about the strength of Cornish political identity on the basis of Mebyon 
Kernow’s (MK) limited electoral performance overlooks the significant impact of Cornish 
identity in the local political landscape and its capacity to set the agenda.   Instead, Cornish 
identity has become a political idea that all parties feel that they have to engage with, not just 
overtly nationalist ones. 
      Mebyon Kernow: the Party for Cornwall began in 1951 as a pressure group, drawing on 
working relationships with Plaid Cymru and the International Celtic Congress, but not 
contesting elections until the mid 1960’s (Deacon et al. 2003).  Several Cornish members of 
parliament have also been members of MK, including John Pardoe, David Mudd (Payton, 
1993), and the Liberal Democrat MP for St Ives and Penzance between 1997-2015, Andrew 
George; indicating that there is more support for MK than analysis election results  suggests.  
Indeed, Payton (1993) notes a strong anti-metropolitan bias across 20
th
 Century Cornish 
politics, combining socio-economic critiques with calls for some form of devolved decision 
making, to which the London-based parties have responded to some degree.  To explore 
identity in Cornish politics we take a thematic approach identifying three core identity 
themes.  
 
Boundary politics. Devonwall and keep Cornwall whole 
The integrity of the Cornish/Devon border has been a contentious issue for a long time 
(Payton, 1993).  This incorporates  furore from the centralisation of policing services between 
Devon and Cornwall starting in 1964 and continues across the modernising, centralising and 
‘rationalising’ of many services in what came to be neologised as ‘Devonwall’ (Deacon et al., 
2003).  Accepted as necessary by most political groupings but fiercely resisted by MK and 
associated identity-based campaigners, resistance to Devonwall is articulated in an MK press 
release as that “Any erosion of our traditional boarders whether they be along the Tamar in 
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the South or the Marsland to the North, would be bitterly resented by all true Cornishmen” 
(Mebyon Kernow 1970).  Clearly the identities exploited in contemporary Cornish economic 
development has much deeper roots than the New Regionalism’s emphasis on regional 
competitiveness (Hilpert 2006; Herschel 2010).  Instead it has been a central tenet of MK’s 
campaigning; including for a Cornish EU parliamentary constituency, Cornish layers of 
economic governance, and to prevent further centralisation of services.  At times this has 
attracted more cross-party support (Payton 1993), but the most striking example of this is also 
the most recent.  
     The proposal to create cross Cornish-Devon parliamentary constituencies as a part of the 
coalition government’s Boundary Review (Western Morning News 2012) caught people 
unawares, and echoed the earlier ‘Devonwall’.  Only a few years earlier in opposition, the 
Conservatives announced a shadow Cornwall Minister (Cameron 2007) – although this role 
was not continued as part of the coalition government.  Previous Devonwall opposition had 
been confined to what might loosely be called the ‘pro-Cornish’ movement (Payton 1991).  
This current example caused widespread cross-party opposition, particularly from the Liberal 
Democrat Mayor of Saltash (a border town between Cornwall and Devon) as well as from all 
six Cornish MP’s – half each Conservative and Liberal Democrat (BBC 2010). A lively and 
well attended rally for the cause was joined by representatives of all parties involved in 
Cornish electoral politics, including Liberal Democrats and Conservatives speaking against 
their own (coalition) government.  Plans to delay the implementation until 2018 were carried 
by Liberal Democrat intervention in the House of Lords (Business Cornwall 2013) and the 
Liberal Democrats have been a leading force in this debate.   
     But do actions like these constitute a growing sense and mobilisation of local identity that 
might be linked to the utility of identity for development and governance purposes (Giles et 
al. 2013; Lee et al. 2005)?  We claim that traditionally, boundary politics has been an MK 
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preserve that is occasionally utilised by the London-based parties.  What is striking about 
‘Keep Cornwall Whole’, was that regardless of how MP’s eventually voted, it would have 
been political suicide not to visibly support the campaign, and it certainly seems to reflect a 
deepening confidence in a broadly supported sense of Cornish identity.  Whilst Cornish 
Culture has become embedded into governance and economic development discourses, it has 
also become legitimised as a part of the political debate. 
 
A Cornish Assembly 
Although regional governance is embedded into EU structures (Keating 2008) and regions 
have a much stronger voice on an EU scale than previously (Hepburn and Elias 2011), this is 
not translated to the national level of government, where persons in Cornwall have long felt 
disempowered (Payton 1993).  Once again the movement for Cornish self-determination 
predates the formation of Mebyon Kernow, although the organisation has been an important 
driver over the years (Jenkin 1991; Deacon et al. 2003).  Nearly 30 years after the Kilbrandon 
Commission (1973) recommended against devolution for Cornwall (although suggesting that 
Cornwall’s unique territorial status be recognised), the 2001 Declaration for a Cornish 
Assembly provided an impressive mobilisation of local identity.  The declaration stated that 
“Cornwall is a nation with its own identity, culture, traditions and history” gathering just over 
50,000 signatures, approximately 10% of the Cornish electorate (Deacon et al 2003).  
Although beginning as an MK initiative, it grew in tandem with the Cornish Constitutional 
Convention (initiated by MK, an Independent councillor, and a non-politically aligned 
activist).  Demonstrating how Cornish identity resonates with, and mobilises local people, it 
became a cross-party campaign, including 4 of Cornwall’s 5 MPs and over 130 councillors of 
all parties.  External to Cornwall, signatories included MPs, MEPS, Plaid Cymru Welsh 
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Assembly members, SNP MSPs and several members of the Dáil Éireann (Deacon et al. 
2003).  
       Beyond appointing a shadow Cornwall Minister in the run up to the 2010 general 
election, the national Conservative party was less inclined towards devolution for Cornwall 
with no manifesto or policy commitments, although there were a few press statements.  David 
Cameron claimed that “We're going to devolve a lot of power to Cornwall” (West Briton 
2010), and Greg Clark, the Cities and Constitution minister has stated that there was an 
“appetite” to devolve powers to Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly (Demianyk 2014b). 
      Although ignored by the then Labour government, a number of important later milestones 
occurred.  David Whalley Liberal Democrat leader of the then Cornwall County Council 
justified the creation of a Unitary Authority as paving the way for a Cornish assembly 
(Cornish Constitutional Convention 2010).  In 2009, Dan Rogerson, Liberal Democrat MP 
for North Cornwall proposed a Government of Cornwall Bill in Parliament setting out how a 
devolved legislature would function in Cornwall (Rogerson 2009).  More recently, the 
Liberal Democrats at their 2014 Spring conference became the first political party outside of 
MK to adopt a Cornish Assembly as a part of their policy (Demianyk 2014a), a pledge that 
they reaffirmed in Spring 2015 (The Cornishman 2015).  There appears to be a growing 
acceptance by other political parties that they need to engage strongly with Cornish national 
identity.  However the Assembly and boundary politics might be considered to have a 
rational political rationale behind their adoption by the mainstream parties.  This is a less easy 
claim with Cornish language policy, also at the heart of Cornish political identity. 
 
Cornish language policy 
Since Henry Jenner’s attempt to revive the Cornish language through his 1904 Handbook of 
the Cornish Language, language has been a significant part of Cornish Politics,  and was 
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taken up enthusiastically by MK who stated in 1951 that number two of their aims was to 
“foster the Cornish language and literature” (Jenkin 1991).  The promotion and use of the 
language has remained an important part of the MK manifesto ever since.  Importantly, this 
has deeper roots than functional identity/economy links such as retaining competitive 
advantage (Herschel 2010), or providing an avenue for the commodification of culture 
(Bessiere 1998).  Whilst the no other party has incorporated the Cornish language into their 
campaigns, it was a Liberal Democrat Cornwall Council which first set a Cornish Language 
policy in 2009 (Cornwall Council 2009a), and which promoted the use of bilingual road and 
street signs (This is Plymouth 2009).  Many other non-MK controlled town councils have 
also produced their own policies, illustrating that is it not solely a party political matter.  Most 
recently, the current Liberal Democrat and Independent controlled Cornwall Council gave the 
Cornish Language Partnership £500,000 a year for language development which unusually 
drew praise from Labour party members on the Council (Davis 2013), and the coalition 
government announced an additional £120,000 in funding (BBC 2014).  
     Additionally, and following years of vigorous campaigning by both MK and non-
politically aligned individuals; Cornish language, national identity and ethnicity has become 
officially recognised as a ‘national minority’ under the European Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities.  The announcement was made by Liberal Democrat 
MP’s Danny Alexander and Stephen Williams in April 2014 (Gov.uk 2014); aims to ensure 
equal treatment of minorities; and institutionalises support for minority cultural practices 
such as languages.  Evidently Cornwall Cornish identity means much more than political 






Clearly there is a correlation in Cornwall between a newly confident identity, regional 
development practices which value the utility of identity, and the willingness of mainstream 
parties to adopt territory previously considered the preserve of Cornish nationalism.  There 
are two things to draw out of the above analyses to support the claim that support for Cornish 
identity politics has become widespread and ubiquitous.   
     Firstly, it is striking that Cornish identity politics is not confined to the nationalist political 
party, Mebyon Kernow.  Instead, in the tussle for votes between the dominant parties in the 
region the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party; both have borrowed rhetoric and 
policy drawn from identity politics.  In so doing they have encroached on traditional 
nationalist MK territory, skewing support away from MK, and making it impossible to judge 
the strength of Cornish nationalism on the basis of MK’s electoral support.   
     The second point is related to the marginal nature of the Cornish constituencies.  General 
elections are won and lost on swing seats, and of Cornwall’s 6 seats, 4 have recently been in 
the highest 10 percent most marginal (Hough and Cracknell 2013).  In the 2010 general 
election, the Camborne and Redruth constituency was won by the Conservatives from the 
Liberal Democrats by just 66 votes, a figure exceeded by the number of spoiled ballot 
papers.  This means that Cornwall is in a similar position to the Cubans in the swing state of 
Florida, who make up a key ethnic identification that can shift the vote on winning or losing 
the state (Eckstein 2009).  Cornwall and Cornwall-centric issues form part of the narrative in 
four of the key marginal UK seats, which helps explain the use of identity politics.  Although 
MK have maintained and shaped some of the key debates around this narrative in Cornish 
politics, it forms an exploitable quantity to bolster the electoral capital of those wishing to 
form a UK government.  This must also mean that identity politics resonates strongly with 
civil society in Cornwall, or it would not have acquired this type of significance.  It appears 
that this shift has happened relatively recently or presumably the Liberal Democrats and the 
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Conservatives would have taken up these key and deeply symbolic MK policies far earlier, 
supporting the thesis that the mobilisation of Cornish identity is growing in popularity over 
time.    
 
Conclusion  
It is impossible to say at this stage that there is a causal relationship between the growth of 
regionalism, identity politics in contemporary economic development, and the improved 
agenda setting capacity of Mebyon Kernow in Cornwall.  However there does appear to be a 
strong correlation which warrants further investigation.  Far from the globalised neo-liberal 
economy signalling an end to territorial differentiation (Bauman 2011) and the 
homogenisation of identities in the UK and in Europe (Ariely 2012), it has provided the 
spaces and platforms for territorial identities to make a resurgence.   The movement which 
has diminished national trade barriers and encouraged a globalised or supranational economy 
(Dicken, 2007), has allowed regions to become increasingly autonomous economic units 
(Keating, 2008).     We have seen through both theoretical and empirical examples that the 
rise of regionalism maps onto an emphasis of individuation for competitive advantage 
(Herschel 2010; Aula and Harmaakorpi 2008). For rational economic reasons such as 
attracting investment, operating within the global market, and the development of social and 
human capital; regionalism has brought with it a fusion of culture, politics and economic 
development (see Hilpert 2006; Halfacree 2012; Lee et al. 2005; Atterton 2007).   This has 
become very evident in Cornwall, where Cornish national identity has become a growth area 
within popular discourse, fostered by a feedback loop between local economic development 
narratives and the resonance of Cornish identity.  In turn, this extends the breadth and depth 
of Cornish identity as experienced by local people, and fed back into the economy.  This is 
neatly encapsulated by Cornwall Council’s most recent economic development strategy 
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(2014), which is based on the assumption of the interplay between the economy and 
culture.  That territorial identity politics has risen to the top of the agenda in this way infuses 
the discursive space of popular culture with assertions of regional difference and a 
celebration of regional strengths.  This facilitates the space for the growing mobilisation of 
autonomist, devolutionist and separatist politics gaining traction across Europe (Miley 2013; 
Boonen and Hooghe 2014; Daily Telegraph 2014).   
      Regionalist identity politics is thereby strengthened through a tripartite conceptual system 
meaning that devolution and separatism runs much deeper than merely a cultural 
phenomenon - which happens to have brought forth a political movement.  Instead it may 
have become embedded within an economic framework which underpins a popular 
worldview.  What this calls for now, is a comprehensive comparative study between EU 
regions, economic policy and practice, and autonomist and separatist movements.   This also 
signals the requirement for serious strategic debate across the EU about the relationship 
between the contemporary economy, nations and regions, autonomy and separatism.  It also 
means that both the academy and policy needs to consider more of the interplay between 
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